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Book Review
Presidential Seizure In Labor Disputes. By John L. Blackman, Jr.
Harvard University Press, Cambridge: 1967. Pp. 351, including
appendix and index.
According to Dr. Blackman, his "...
volume represents a tentative effort to study as a separate phenomenon of industrial relations
those disputes in which the presidents have intervened with coercive
measures to keep production going over the protest of one or both
parties."' Dr. Blackman is too modest. He has not produced a "tentative effort." He has produced an incredibly comprehensive and detailed
study of presidential intervention, examining ". . . not only the 71
cases using seizure but the 23 cases using other means of control." 2
Dr. Blackman has collected all the historic incidents of seizure
in labor disputes, beginning with the Civil War. His volume is an informational tour de force. He has even found cases of seizure previously
overlooked by commentators. He has catalogued, collated, compared,
cross-indexed and commented on all incidents of seizure in addition to
similar extraordinary exercises of presidential power. He did not
attempt the impossible task of uncovering and commenting on all cases
in which the President was able to settle labor disputes through informal pressure and the threat of coercive action. He did, however,
discuss that subject sufficiently to provide an appropriate counterpoint
to his main theme.
My only negative criticism of the book pertains to style and
technical approach. Dr. Blackman's array of facts is so overwhelming
that reading his book is a chore. Further, his collection and analysis
of facts leave him very little room for comprehensive overview and
suggestion of policy and program. The admissions price is too high
for the casual reader. This book will be read only on a need-to-know
basis. Yet, the book obviously serves an important function. In fact,
it is especially useful and timely.
Dr. Blackman's book serves to call up the question of the proper
extension of executive power to meet the challenges of the industrial
society we have evolved. The founders of our republic envisioned a
tri-partite system of government in which the legislative, executive
and judicial powers were carefully separated. This system was to
govern for the ages. However, it was drawn from the experiences of
a young, predominately agricultural society. Our society no longer
bears those characteristics. In the system that evolved, the divisions
of governmental power are not nearly as clear as those Montesquieu
may have intended; and executive, not legislative, primacy has resulted.
1. J. BLACKMAN, PRESIDENTIAL SEIZURE IN LABOR DISPUTES 16 (1967).
2. Id. Actually during the period 1947 to 1968, the emergency strike injunction
provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act, §§ 206-10 of the Labor-Management Relations
Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 176-80 (1964), were invoked a total of 29 times. 70 LAB. REL.
REP. 321 (1969).
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The pressures of the twentieth century are causing us consciously to
reconsider our formal and informal organization of power, both governmental and private. Much of the pressure arises from dislocations
associated with the advent of the atomic or new industrial age. While
the pressure exists throughout our society, the configuration of forces
does take a peculiarly visible form within the arena of labor-management or industrial relations.
Industrial relations are still ordered according to comparatively
free and private systems of collective bargaining. However, continuation of such systems of "private" ordering depends in large part on
the parties' sense of responsibility and self-restraint. Such qualities
are becoming increasingly rare. All the parties to many recent disputes
have been grossly irresponsible. The basic steel industry provides a
notable example. Critical services provided by police, fire department,
school, sanitation and transportation employees, have been seriously
disrupted during labor disputes. Each new round of collective bargaining negotiations causes new shock waves to escalate our inflationary wage-price spiral. In some industries, wages and benefits have
already outstripped productivity. In others, producers are fleeing to
Mexico where depressed labor costs improve profit pictures.
None of the ordinary techniques of regulation seem capable of
altering the picture. The national labor laws do not purport to impose
economic solutions on parties to collective bargaining. Neither fiscalmonetary controls nor wage-price guidelines have stopped the inflationary upswing. Special congressional legislation, such as that requiring
compulsory arbitration to resolve recent railroad disputes, and existing
emergency strike laws do not provide lasting solutions or relief.
Continuation of these conditions will cause us to seek more permanent and drastic solutions.' Congress might authorize government
review of collective bargaining agreements; disputes might generally
be resolved through compulsory arbitration. Congress might delegate
general power to the President or he might informally assume such
authority. It is unlikely that this new power would be confined to the
area of labor relations or that it would be temporary. Throughout our
history, ubiquitous executive power has almost constantly increased.
With notable exceptions during the nineteenth century, Congress
has freely delegated great power to the President. In addition, the
President has exercised inherent and extraordinary powers since the
very beginning of the republic. Virtually all Presidents have found it
necessary to undertake domestic actions having enormous consequences
for the nation, often in advance of consideration or specific authorization by the Congress. In the twentieth century, as social complexities
have increased, the rate of accretion of executive power has also
accelerated. Franklin Roosevelt ordered that Americans of Japanese
descent be detained in concentration camps; Truman ordered the steel
mills seized; Eisenhower and Kennedy deployed massive police and
military forces to uphold court decisions against racial discrimination;
Kennedy terrorized the steel industry into rescinding price increases;
3. See Address by George P. Schultz, Secretary of Labor, American Arbitration Association dinner, Apr. 9, 1969. 70 LAB. RL. RtP. 409, 411-12 (1969).
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Johnson deployed military forces to control large scale riots and then
established a Civil Disorder War Room in the Pentagon.
Dr. Blackman's efforts reveal that almost invariably presidential
intervention in domestic labor relations is related to critical issues of
international order and economy. Usually martial or international
considerations have prompted the President to take extraordinary steps
on his own or have compelled Congress to authorize his actions, both
in labor and in other domestic crises. This lesson was made unmistakable in the 1952 steel seizure dispute. President Truman justified
his action on the ground that it was necessary for successful prosecution of the Korean War. The Supreme Court found the justification
unavailing in the face of Congress's clear decision that the President
should not be authorized to use the seizure power as Truman had used
it.4 However, the Court left Congress free to authorize such action.
Study of the Supreme Court decisions passing on Congress's
power to regulate interstate commerce reveals the manner in which
we have come to view our domestic economy as an integrated whole,
rather than a free and atomized market. The recent congressional
and judicial decisions concerning the federal commerce power disclose
that we have come to view our total domestic society as an integrated
whole.5 Furthermore, it is increasingly obvious that our domestic
and international affairs are similarly interwoven. Many fear that this
close relationship is being used to bind all our actions and interests
to the overwhelming expediency of national security.6
After reading Dr. Blackman's book, I wonder whether, when,
and to what extent, Congress might issue a carte blanche delegation
to the President to control economic and other dislocation because of
the relation between all domestic activity and interstate commerce and
the interests of national security and international affairs. 7 Of course,
the Supreme Court's prohibition of "unconfined and vagrant" delegation 8 may save us. But, if some future President, like Julius Caesar,
chooses to cross the Rubicon, will Congress refuse him a crown, and
will the Supreme Court say them nay?
Even if my allusion to Julius Caesar is hyperbole, it is no exaggeration to suggest that crisis is becoming commonplace in our complex
society. Domestic and international affairs are becoming inseparable.
The operation of power in the ordinary conditions of the future may
well resemble the operation of power in the emergency conditions of
the past. Consequently, we may be better equipped to address questions of organizing power for the present and the future if we possess
adequate background information concerning the use of power during
moments of crisis in the past.
4. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
5. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta
Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) ; Fair Housing Law, 42 U.S.C.A.
§§ 3601-36 (1969) ; Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. II, 42 U.S.C. 2000a to a-6 (1964).
6. See, e.g., Miller, The Constitutional Law of the "Security State," 10 STAN.

L. Rnv. 620 (1958).

7. Cf. Bay of Tonkin Resolution, 78 Stat. 384 (1964).
8. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 440 (1935) (Cardozo, J., dissenting) ; accord, A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
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Substantial studies of the extraordinary use of presidential power
are rare.' Fortunately, Dr. Blackman has produced his comprehensive
volume on the labor relations facet of the subject. The information
he gathered can help us to re-evaluate some of our basic postulates or
myths concerning the organization of power. He has spread the historic and factual record on presidential seizure in labor disputes. He
has also provided some helpful analysis of the record by addressing
the questions: "How extensive was presidential control over the labor
and other economic activities of the disputing parties in each case?
What standards of labor and of public administration were observed
during the period of control? ' ' 1O His survey reveals our overriding
needs for flexibility and yet for stern enforcement of governmental
decisions once they are made.' Rigidity leads to unnecessary confrontation and intervention in private decision making. Failure of
enforcement, however, tends to reinforce any tendencies toward civil
disobedience or manipulation. 2
By recounting past practices, Dr. Blackman has provided the
backdrop for developing new approaches to all the emergency and
ordinary conditions of modern industrial society, and not merely those
concerning labor relations. Study of his book should reveal an historic
and factual basis upon which we can draw to plan action necessary to
maintain a viable democratic order in which we maximize private
decision making and freedom, consistent with the realities of a technological society.
Sanford Jay Rosen*
9. I cannot speak for the political science departments of our colleges and universities, but extraordinary use of presidential power receives little attention in law
school. Some comes up in constitutional law, and some in labor law. Usually one or
two cases, and perhaps a statute, are studied. Instructors and students alike never gain
significant understanding of the subject, and never really know the facts. Occasionally
a seminar is offered, but only occasionally. In 1961-62, the Yale Law School's major
public law seminar was concerned entirely with the question of presidential power to
advance civil rights in the absence of additional federal legislation.
10. J. BLACKMAN, PRESIDENTIAL SEIZURE IN LABOR DISPUTES 16-17 (1967).
11. See generally Rosen, Civil Disobedience and Other Such Techniques: Law
Making Through Law Breaking, 37 Gzo. WASH. L. Rzv. 435 (1969).
12. See, e.g., J. BLACKMAN, PRESIDENTIAL SEIZURE IN LABOR DISPUTES 44-48

(1967).

* Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law. Associate Director,
Council on Legal Education Opportunity. A.B., 1959, Cornell University; LL.B., 1962,
Yale University.

